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Abstract
Using data from the 2010 China Family Panel Study and county- and industry-level
statistics, we estimate cross-classified multilevel models to examine the determinants of
the income gap among Chinese workers. Results show that both regional and industrial
differences are important sources of income inequality in China. Taken together, they
account for about one fifth of the total variation in individual income. Among them,
differences in county explains 7%, while difference in industry accounts for 14% of the
total variation. Further analyses demonstrate that county- and industry-level variables
have significant independent effects on individual income even after controlling for
individual socio-demographic characteristics and human capital resources. We also
explore the potential mechanisms through which macro-level factors function in
widening income gaps among Chinese workers. Our results show industrial monopolies
have been a key driver of the elevated income inequality in China.
Keywords: Income inequality, Income distribution, Labor market segmentation, Regional
segregation, Industrial monopoly
Introduction
China witnessed rapid economic growth and great alleviation of poverty since its eco-
nomic reform. However, China’s income gap widened substantially at the same time,
and income inequality has become a major threat to sustainable economic develop-
ment and continuous improvement in living standards. Recent social surveys prove
that income inequality is regarded as the leading social problem facing contemporary
China, ahead of all other critical challenges such as corruption, unemployment, and
environmental pollution (see Xie et al. 2013: 349). Therefore, it is essential that social
scientists explore the underlying mechanisms through which income distribution is de-
termined in China, especially the social and institutional factors that drive the level of
inequality.
There is a growing body of literature that focuses on the rising income inequality in
China that has occurred during the reform era, which suggests that China has been
transformed from a relatively egalitarian society into a society with significant income
gaps over the past several decades.1 These studies suggest that market transition and
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institutional barriers play important roles in the dramatic change, with rural–urban
segregation, sector variation, and regional and industrial differences identified as the
leading structural causes for the unequal distribution of income. Nevertheless, to date,
previous studies on this topic remain fragmented in that it is rare for the previously
mentioned factors to be synthesized within a unified framework or to be examined sim-
ultaneously. As a result, our knowledge regarding how social mechanisms affect income
inequality as well as the relative contribution of different factors is still limited in terms
of both theory building and empirical evidence.
In this study, we base our investigation on an extended labor market segmentation
theory and empirically examine how different structural and institutional factors con-
tribute to the elevated income inequality in China. In particular, we pay special atten-
tion to the relative roles that regional segregation and industrial monopoly play in the
determination of individual income by fitting cross-classified multilevel models. Com-
pared with previous studies, this study fills the gap in the literature in three important
aspects: First, given the institutional reality of “departmental and regional segregation
(tiao kuai fenge)” in the Chinese governance system, we simultaneously consider indus-
try and regional factors, creating a cross-classified framework of labor markets. This
enables us to disentangle the independent effects of different contextual factors affect-
ing income inequality. Furthermore, within this general framework, we also consider
other social and structural factors such as gender, residence type, education, political
capital, occupation, and work unit. By doing so, we provide one of the most compre-
hensive examinations of China’s income inequality issue to date. Second, we depart
from previous studies by including both urban and rural residents in our analysis in-
stead of only focusing on urban samples. This is because rural–urban differences ac-
count for a large proportion of the total inequality in China, and it is highly likely that
we underestimate the level of inequality and even produce misleading results if we ex-
clude rural samples. Third, compared with other studies on regional variations of in-
come, we use county as our unit of analysis rather than province or city. By focusing
on a smaller and relatively homogeneous regional unit, it is likely that we can better
capture regional variations and more precisely estimate the effect of regional barriers
on individual income.
Literature review and research design
Market transition, labor market segmentation, and income inequality
The study of inequality has always constituted a core of sociology. Different from clas-
sical economic theory, which views wages or income as the price of human capital
(such as skills and work experiences) in the labor market, and which are in turn deter-
mined by the supply and demand forces of market competition, sociological theory
generally emphasizes the socio-structural and institutional facets of income determin-
ation. In particular, labor market segmentation theory argues that labor markets are
never a perfect competitive market as portrayed by classical economic theory, but in-
stead are always embedded in other social institutions and specific social arrangements.
According to this theory, the labor market in modern societies is usually segregated
into two relatively isolated parts: the primary market and the secondary market. They
correspond to the core sector and the peripheral sector of the economic industry,
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respectively (Beck et al. 1978). In the primary labor market, jobs are generally well paid
and well protected, the working environment is superior, and there are more opportun-
ities for promotion. By contrast, in the secondary labor market, jobs are often under-
paid, less secure, and with little opportunity for career advancement (Cain 1976;
Kalleberg and Sorensen 1979). In short, labor market segmentation theory indicates
that earnings are not simply determined by individual stock of human capital and mar-
ket competition, and therefore, it is important to examine the contextual and institu-
tional forces in order to fully understand income inequality in a given society.
With respect to China, the labor market was essentially non-existent before the reform
era. Under the central planning and redistributive economy system, individual income
was mainly determined by one’s work unit and its relevant ranking in the redistribution
sequence. In general, people who work in state-owned enterprises, especially in those
work units with higher administrative ranking, earn more. Within a given work unit, in-
come is relatively equally distributed among its workers (Walder 1992). Beginning with
marketization reform, China’s labor market has formed gradually, which in turn has led to
dramatic changes to income distribution and the overall economic structure in China
(Bian and Zhang 2002; Liu 2006).
The market transition has been the focus of theoretical debates and empirical investiga-
tions regarding income distribution in China. According to market transition theory (Nee
1989), due to systematic differences in income determination between a market economy
and a redistributive economy, marketization will necessarily increase income returns from
human capital and depreciate the value of political capital at the same time. Following this
proposition, many studies have focused on the diversifying effect of market reform on in-
dividual income under the framework of state vs. market (Bian and Logan 1996; Zhou
2000). These studies show that the income distribution system varies over time and has
substantial between-sector differences. Although marketization leads to significant in-
crease of income returns from human capital, political capital remains an important
determinant of income in China, especially within state-owned sector (Zang 2002; Zhou
2000). Compared with state-owned sector, human capital receives higher rewards from
the private sector. Nonetheless, the pace of income growth has been very rapid in state-
owned sector in recent years, which has regained its earnings advantage over the private
sector (Bian and Zhang 2002).
Although previous studies suggest that sector variation is a critical source of income
inequality in China, the simple dichotomous classification of state and market sectors
is far from adequate for understanding the pattern of income distribution in contem-
porary China. In addition to ownership differences, there is substantial income vari-
ation across different regions, industries, as well as work units (Wang and Wang 2005).
Wang and Wang (2005) emphasize that various collective social groups play a critical
role in determining income distribution in China. During the process of market transi-
tion, to maintain their collective interests, relevant social groups take advantage of the
inherited influences from the old central planning system and seek to maximize collect-
ive benefits. Within each social group, income tends to be distributed relatively equally
among its members. As a result, income inequality can rapidly widen between social
groups while remaining relatively stable within groups. Their empirical investigation
shows that differences across regions, industries, and ownership types are important
sources of income inequality, and they together account for about half of the total
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variation in individual income in China. In particular, the impact of regional and indus-
trial variation on individual income is rising rapidly. In addition, there are also studies
that examine labor market segmentation in terms of gender (Deng and Ding 2012),
hukou type (Li and Gu 2011), and occupational status (Wu 2011), indicating the com-
plex and multiplistic nature of labor market segmentation in Chinese society.
Overall, these previous studies imply that the underlying social mechanisms that deter-
mine income distribution are quite complicated, and it is insufficient to simply apply the
state vs. market perspective to explain changes in income distribution in China following
marketization reform. In fact, administrative power and market power have often been
intertwined during the process of market transition in China, and they together determine
the structural characteristics of sector segregation, distributions of various resources,
labor market conditions, and consequently the level of income inequality. Therefore, we
need to develop a more comprehensive analytical framework to effectively understand the
process of income determination in China. In the following, based on the institutional ar-
rangement of “departmental and regional segregation (tiao kuai fenge)” of the Chinese
governance system, we argue that industry and region form a dual segmentation of the
labor market, together constituting the basic structure of income determination in China.
Industry and region segmentation, jointly with other social forces such as gender, resi-
dence type, occupation, and work unit, together construct a complex picture of income
distribution in contemporary China.
Industrial monopoly and income inequality
Among the many factors affecting income distribution, variations in income by industry
has received much attention, especially in the economic literature. Statistical data show
that income gaps across different industries have been substantial during the reform
era, rising continuously since the late 1980s (Cai et al. 2005; Gu and Feng 2008). As a
result, the relative contribution of inter-industry variation to the total variation in in-
come has also increased dramatically (Chen et al. 2010).
As a matter of fact, income variation by industry is common in modern societies.
Many studies attribute this phenomenon to different compositions of human capital
across industries (e.g., Dickens and Katz 1987; Krueger and Summers 1988). Due to the
nature of work, industries differ in their required skill levels and their investment in
human capital, which can lead to different levels of average rewards being received by
industry workers. Nonetheless, the human capital differential alone cannot explain the
observed inter-industry variations in income, and there still exist persistent income
gaps across industries even after controlling for different human capital compositions
(Katz et al. 1989).
With respect to inter-industry income inequality in transitional China, many studies
attend to the special role that state power plays in the process of market transition.
These studies suggest that the substantial income gaps that exist across different indus-
tries are primarily due to industrial monopoly, endorsed by administrative power. For
instance, Luo and Li (2007) report that although human capital, capital investment,
production scale, and amount of revenue all have significant effects on average indus-
trial income, they together only account for a small portion of income variation by in-
dustry. In contrast, the power that arises from being a monopoly plays a more
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important role in forming inter-industry income gaps (Ren and Zhou 2009; Zhang and
Chen 2008). Monopolized industries in general have much higher average income than
other industries; the higher income is mainly from the result of administrative monop-
oly rather than naturally occurring market monopoly. Based on a decomposition of the
higher income observed in monopolized industries, Yue et al. (2010) find that at least
half of the income gap between monopolized and other industries cannot be justified
by market forces, but instead mainly comes from administrative monopoly endorsed by
governmental power.
These previous studies illustrate the importance of industry segmentation on income
inequality in China, but due to issues such as data availability, there still exist two key
limitations in the current literature. First, industrial monopoly has been singled out as
one of the main forces affecting income inequality across industries; however, monopo-
lized industries differ from other industries in many other important aspects. For ex-
ample, monopolized industries tend to have more human capital stock (Zhang 2004),
and knowledge, skills, and financial capital are also more concentrated in these indus-
tries, which may speed up technological innovation, improve productive efficiency, and
thus increase human capital returns. Hence, to precisely estimate the impact of monop-
oly on income variations by industry, industrial characteristics should be analyzed more
systematically. Second, as a structural factor of the labor market, industry not only af-
fects average employee income, but also greatly influences income distribution for indi-
viduals having different characteristics. However, with one exception (Wang and Cui
2010), there is essentially no study that explores the macro–micro interactions between
industry and individual characteristics with respect to income determination. As a re-
sult, we still know little about the specific mechanisms through which individual in-
come is affected by industry segregation.
Regional segregation and income inequality
The above discussion about inter-industry income gaps presupposes that there is a uni-
fied national labor market. However, in reality, this hypothetical national labor market
rarely exists. Regional variation has always been a special feature of China’s economic
development and institutional change (Walder 1995; Xie and Hannum 1996). Due to
differences in culture, environment, resources, as well as specific governmental policies,
there are wide variations in terms of social and economic development across China’s
different regions. In particular, the strong push to protect local interests and associated
institutional barriers (e.g., the hukou system) hamper the formation of a unified na-
tional labor market; as a result, local labor markets are relatively segregated and closed
to each other. In fact, market competition has not yet been able to equalize income
returns for all local markets, and it is crucial to simultaneously take into account re-
gional segregation when we study the industry segregation of income.
China’s market transition is a gradual process. Industry compositions and labor mar-
ket conditions vary substantially across different regions due to differences in develop-
ment strategies, sector structures, and levels of economic maturity. Many studies show
that regional characteristics are important determinants of individual income in urban
China (Bian and Zhang 2002; Hao and Li 2006; Xie and Hannum 1996). Moreover,
studies also show that the income determination mechanism differs greatly across
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regions. For instance, Liu and Qu’s study (2008) indicates that, although industrial en-
terprises have higher wage levels in both Beijing and Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces,
the underlying mechanisms differ. In Jiangsu and Zhejiang, the higher wages are mainly
due to higher production efficiency and better human capital returns led by an effective
labor market and sufficient labor mobility among different sectors and industries. By
contrast, Beijing’s high wages are more closely associated with industrial monopoly and
administrative barriers, all of which leads to higher corporate profits through rent-
seeking behaviors. In short, regional heterogeneity cannot be neglected if we are to fully
understand China’s income distribution.
In addition, there are also studies that examine the impact of the hukou system, local
protectionism, and employment discrimination against outsiders on local labor market
outcomes. These studies show that rural-to-urban migrants and urban native residents
are segregated in terms of sector entrance, industry entrance, and occupational attainment
(Meng and Zhang 2001; Wang et al. 2002). This kind of labor market segmentation exists
not only between agricultural and non-agricultural hukou holders, but also between mi-
grants and natives more generally (Guo and Zhang 2012; Li and Gu 2011). To a certain
extent, regional segregation is replacing the rural–urban divide to become the main facet
of labor market segmentation in China (Zhang 2007). This regional segregation, together
and intertwined with segregations by sector, industry, and occupation, constitutes the
basic structure of China’s labor market and the resulting income inequality.
Research design
As discussed above, the labor market in contemporary China is simultaneously segre-
gated by multiple structural and institutional factors. They tend to overlap and inter-
twine with each other to determine the pattern of income distribution in transitional
China. Therefore, it is insufficient or even misleading to simply talk about region or
industry segregation of income alone. In this study, by taking into account the institu-
tional arrangement of “departmental and regional segregation (tiao kuai fenge)”, we
examine the simultaneous impact of region and industry segregation on income in-
equality. By doing so, we are able to distinguish the independent effect of industry
segregation from region segregation and to better understand the complex impact of
labor market segmentation on income inequality in transitional China.
To be more specific, firstly, industry itself creates a natural barrier for the free mobility
of laborers. As the saying goes, “Going through different industries is like going through
mountains (ge hang ru ge shan).” In modern society, each industry usually requires that its
practitioners possess some specialized skills. This means that the acquired skills and accu-
mulated working experiences in one industry cannot be transferred into other industries
without certain sunk and transitional costs. When an individual chooses to enter an in-
dustry, we often see that his/her subsequent job changes are generally limited within that
industry, indicating that inter-industry transition costs may be huge. Moreover, there exist
strict entry restrictions for many industries, either due to natural constraints, such as
lands and mine resources, or due to state monopolies on key industries that are regarded
as an indispensable part to the national interest (basic energies, public infrastructure, pub-
lic finance, etc.). This is especially true in China, where state intervention plays a much
larger role in its economic development than in other countries. According to the national
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development strategy, the value assigned to different industries or sectors, due to specific
policy initiatives or goals, will impact their priority in receiving national resources. This
practice may further widen inter-industry income gaps through the so-called Matthew ef-
fect. All in all, as a structural barrier in the labor market, industry characteristics have an
important say in the determination of individual income, and hence are indispensible to
our understanding of income inequality in a society.
Second, labor market is also restricted by local borders. This is especially so in China,
given its hukou administrative system, regionalized economic development policy, and
localized financing and taxation arrangements. To protect its own interests, local gov-
ernments have a strong motive to adopt and practice local protectionism such as en-
couraging the development of local enterprises and securing employment for native
residents via special policy interventions. This may hamper the formation of a unified
national market for commodities and laborers. These decentralized administrative mea-
sures taken by local governments further raise barriers and costs for labor mobility
across regions and exacerbate regional labor market segmentation. Region segregation
and industry segregation overlap and intertwine with each other, and they together lay
out the basic institutional arrangement that regulates individual economic behaviors
and income returns. Therefore, to examine income inequality more comprehensively,
we bring region and industry factors into a unified analytical framework. By simultan-
eously analyzing the impacts of various region and industry characteristics on individ-
ual income, we are able to better understand the relative importance as well as specific
mechanisms by which different socio-structural factors affect income inequality in
China.
Third, taking as our starting point the dual labor market segmentation by indus-
try and region, we extend our analysis of income inequality by including other im-
portant social and structural factors for income determination such as gender,
residence type, education, occupation, party membership, and type of work unit.
As mentioned above, although a number of studies have examined these factors
separately and concluded that they are important sources of income inequality in
China, there is essentially no study that has done so systematically using a dual
labor market segmentation framework. As a result, some key questions regarding
the macro–micro mechanisms generating income inequality have not been ad-
dressed adequately. Take gender inequality as an example, can regional economic
development have an external effect so as to cause income gaps between males
and females to converge? Are female workers less discriminated against in terms of
earnings if they work in an industry with a higher proportion of female employees?
Our study will shed some light on these important issues.
Based on the above design, our empirical investigations aim to address the following
three questions: First, how much do region segregation and industry segregation, taken
individually, contribute to the overall income inequality among Chinese residents?
Which one plays the major role? Second, can differences in average income across re-
gions and industries be explained away by different compositions of population and hu-
man capital, or are they due to the genuine impact of region and industry
characteristics? Third, how do region and industry characteristics affect individual in-
come? In other words, what are the main macro–micro linkages that drive income gaps
among individuals?
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Data and method
Data sources
The main data for this study come from the adult file and county file of the 2010 Chinese
Family Panel Study (CFPS). In addition, we also compile a data file for industry character-
istics based on published statistics from the 2008 Chinese Economic Census. The CFPS is
a nationally representative sampling survey project conducted by the Institute of Social
Science Survey at Peking University. The purpose of CFPS is to monitor broad themes in
social change including population, economy, health, family, and communities in contem-
porary China. CFPS2010 is the baseline survey for this panel project. In this survey,
14,608 families and their members were randomly selected and interviewed from 25
provinces in mainland China.
To examine variation in individual income, we restrict our analysis to working-age
(16–64) individuals who were employed at the time of the interview. After excluding
samples with missing values for key variables, the analytical sample for this study con-
sists of 14,698 individuals.2
Sample characteristics and relevant region and industry information are presented in
Table 1. As Table 1 shows, the average monthly income is 1306 yuan for this sample,
Table 1 Descriptive statistics for key individual, region, and industry variables
Variable Mean/proportion Standard deviation Sample
Individual level
Individual monthly income (yuan) 1306.124 3207.396 14,698
Male 54.5% – 14,698
Urban residents 43.1% – 14,698
Number of years of schooling 6.957 4.981 14,698
Work experience (years) 28.632 13.906 14,698
Party membership 8.2% – 14,698
Occupation’s ISEI 32.884 14.562 14,698
Work at state/collective sector 17.5% – 14,698
Region level
County GDP per capita (10,000 yuan) 4.428 5.360 162
County average of years of schooling 9.139 1.477 162
Industry level
Industry type
Agriculture 5.3% – 19
Industry and manufacturing 21.1% – 19
Service and other 73.7% – 19
Industry age (proportion of entities established after 2000) .643 .198 19
Industry scale (the log of the number of employees) 15.796 1.081 19
Proportion of female employees .368 .122 19
Proportion of employees with higher education .389 .214 19
Proportion of entities owned by statea .082 .107 18
Average revenue per capita (10,000 yuan)a 40.256 35.794 18
aFor the industry of “public administration and social organizations,” the relevant statistics are not available. In the
following analysis, we replaced the missing values with the sample mean and added a dummy variable indicating
this missingness
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and its standard deviation is roughly three times as large as its mean, indicating wide
income gaps among these respondents. In this sample, males account for 55%, urban
residents account for 43%, and about 8% of the sample are members of the Communist
Party. The average number of years of education is about seven, and the mean occupa-
tional score is 33 according to the International Socioeconomic Index (ISEI). Finally,
around 18% of the sample is employed in state/collective sectors.3
Method
The outcome variable for our analysis is individual monthly income, reported by re-
spondents during the interview as their total income the previous month. Following
common practice, we rescale the original values of income by a natural log transform-
ation to correct for skewness.4 As discussed above, individual income is affected by
both micro-level factors such as sociodemographics as well as human and political cap-
ital, and macro-level factors such as region and industry characteristics. Therefore, we
use a multilevel model to examine these effects simultaneously. Specifically, at the indi-
vidual level, we estimate a refined human capital model similar to Xie and Hannum
(1996), by including respondent’s gender, education, work experience and its square
term, party membership, as well as an interaction between gender and education.
Moreover, we also add respondent’s residence type (rural vs. urban), occupation, and
type of work unit into the model. At the regional level, county-specific GDP per capita
and average years of schooling are included to capture the effects of regional economic
and social development, respectively.5 Finally, at the industry level, we use indicators
similar to Wang and Cui (2010), including industry age, scale, proportion of employees
with higher education (junior college and above), and proportion of entities owned by
state. In addition, we also include dummy variables for industry type, proportion of fe-
male employees, and average revenue per capita. Related information regarding these
variables can be found in Table 1.
With respect to specific model form, we choose to fit cross-classified multilevel
models because each individual belongs to a certain county and industry simultan-
eously, but there is no simple clustering relationship between county and industry.6 To
determine the degree to which region and industry factors account for variations in in-
dividual income, we first estimate a variance components model as follows:
logInci jkð Þ ¼ β0 jkð Þ þ εi jkð Þ ð1Þ
β0 jkð Þ ¼ η000 þ μ0j þ ν0k ð2Þ
Take Eq. (2) into Eq. (1), we get
logInci jkð Þ ¼ η000 þ μ0j þ ν0k þ εi jkð Þ ð3Þ
where subscripts j and k indicate the jth region and the kth industry, respectively. Since
they are not clustered with one another, Eq. (3) uses a bracket to indicate their parallel
relationship. In Eq. (3), μ0j, ν0k, and εi(jk)represent the corresponding residuals of the
dependent variable at the region, industry, and individual levels, respectively. The
model assumes that εi jkð ÞeN 0; σ20i
 




, and ν0keN 0; σ20k
 
.We can decom-
pose the total variations in individual income based on estimates of these parameters.
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After fitting the variance components model, we further add the explanatory variables
at the individual, region, and industry levels into the model to examine the correspond-
ing effects. In the end, we also add cross-level interactions between individual charac-
teristics and region/industry factors to explore possible macro–micro linkages to
income determination. All the models reported in the following are estimated by the
“xtmixed” command in Stata13.0. We also estimate the same models with MLwiN2.26
to check the robustness of the estimating results and find that the estimates are identi-
cal to those from Stata.
Main findings
Segregation by region or industry?
To examine the degree to which segregation by region and segregation by industry ac-
count for income inequality among Chinese workers, we first estimate a variance com-
ponents model. The results are reported in Table 2.
According to the decomposition in Table 2, we can compute the proportions of the
total variation in individual income as explained by region and industry differences, i.e.,
the intra-class correlations (ρ) of the model. Results show that about 7% of the total
variation in individual income is explained by regional variation, 7 another 14% of the
total variation is explained by inter-industry difference,8 and taken together, more than
one fifth (21%) of observed income inequality is due to differences in region or indus-
try. These findings indicate that region and industry segregations are important causes
of elevated income inequality in China. Moreover, the results also suggest that industry
segregation plays a much larger role than does region segregation in explaining individ-
ual income gaps,9 with the relative contribution of the former being twice as large as
the latter.
Our findings are similar to those reported by Luo and Li (2007), whose estimates
based on materials from the first economic census in China show that variation by
province and industry accounts for about 7 and 17%, respectively, of the total variation
in income in China. Our estimate for industry variation is also highly consistent with




Individual level standard deviation (σ0i) 2.511
(.015)
Region level standard deviation (σ0j) .729
(.049)
Industry level standard deviation (σ0k) 1.060
(.175)
Intra-class correlation (region) .067
Intra-class correlation (industry) .141
Intra-class correlation (total) .208
Numbers in brackets are estimated standard errors. The corresponding sample sizes for individual, region, and industry
are 14,698, 162, and 19, respectively
***p < .001
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Wang and Cui’s (2010) 13%. Nonetheless, our results differ substantially from those of
Wang and Wang (2005), whose estimates based on a decomposition of the Theil index
suggest that the impact of regional variation on income inequality is much more im-
portant than that of industry variation. This inconsistency may be caused by their
incomplete data, which only includes three provinces (Guangdong, Liaoning, and Si-
chuan) and thus lacks national representativeness.
Macro and micro factors affecting individual income
In the following, we add individual, region, and industry level explanatory variables into
the model to examine the macro and micro determinants of individual income. Specif-
ically, in model 1, we only add individual level explanatory variables to analyze the mi-
cro effects on income; in model 2, we only include region and industry level variables
to explore possible structural variations; and finally, in model 3, we fit a model that in-
cludes explanatory variables from all levels to consider both micro and macro effects
simultaneously. The corresponding results for these models are shown in Table 3.
As shown in model 1 of Table 3, individual sociodemographics, human capital, and
political capital are all important factors in predicting individual income. Consistent
with previous findings, as the main components of human capital, education, and work
experience, both have significantly positive effects on individual income. Controlling
for other variables in the model, the income return from education differs substantially
across gender. For each additional year of schooling, individual income increases by 7%
for females but only 2% (=.067–.046) for males, which is similar to what is reported by
Xie and Hannum (1996). One possible reason for this pattern is that females with little
education have a much lower income than corresponding males. More working experi-
ence can also increase individual income, but this effect is marginally diminishing as in-
dicated by a negative regression coefficient for its square term. In addition to human
capital, individual sociodemographics also introduce substantive income gaps. On aver-
age, males earn a much higher income than females, and so do urban residents relative
to rural residents. For males who received no education, their average income is 3.5
[=exp(1.253)] times as large as that of their female peers. If both received high school
education, the gap decreases but still remains twice as large [exp(1.253–.046 × 12) =
2.02] due to a higher return from education for females.10 Even after controlling for the
other variables in the model, urban residents earn more than twice [exp(.753) = 2.12] as
much as rural residents, indicating a huge urban to rural premium. In addition, political
capital still matters for individual income in contemporary China, and the average in-
come is 23% higher [=exp(.205)] for party members than non-members. Finally, indi-
vidual income is also affected by occupational status and type of work unit. Holding
other things constant, each additional point on the ISEI score results in individual in-
come increasing by about .1%. Compared with employment by non-state/collective
units, workers at state/collective owned units enjoy an advantage of about 20%
[exp(.167) = 1.18] in their individual income.
After including individual level covariates, the unexplained variances in model 1 de-
cline not only for individual level residuals (σ0i
2 ), but also for residuals (σ0j
2 and σ0k
2 ) at
the region and industry levels, as compared with the variance components results
(model 0) in Table 2. This suggests that at least some of the region and industry
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Table 3 Cross-classified multilevel models for individual monthly income (Log), CFPS2010
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Individual level
Years of schooling .067*** .063***
(.008) (.008)
Work experience .044*** .045***
(.006) (.006)




Urban resident .753*** .694***
(.060) (.060)
Party member .205* .221**
(.082) (.082)
Occupation (ISEI) .009*** .009***
(.002) (.002)
State/collective owned work unit .167* .138†
(.075) (.074)
Male × years of schooling −.046*** −.046***
(.008) (.008)
Region level
GDP per capita .039*** .034**
(.011) (.011)
Average years of schooling .211*** .110**
(.042) (.041)
Industry level
Industry type (reference = agriculture)
Industry and construction 5.802*** 4.087***
(.660) (.643)
Service and other 5.651*** 3.985***
(.654) (.637)
Industry age −.153 .018
(.565) (.554)
Industry scale .033 .008
(.047) (.046)
% of female employees −.684* .112
(.321) (.315)
% of employees with higher education 1.036* .358
(.420) (.412)
% of state owned entities 3.697* 1.777
(1.648) (1.596)
Average revenue per capita −.001 .0002
(.001) (.001)
Intercept 4.734*** −1.685 −1.154
(.239) (1.451) (1.419)
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variations in income are due to different population compositions and human capital
stock across regions and industries.
In model 2 of Table 3, we only include region and industry covariates to examine how
social structural factors affect average individual income. At the region level, we include
GDP per capita and the average years of schooling; at the industry level, we include vari-
ables indicating industry type, industry age, industry scale, the sexual and educational
composition of industry employees, average revenue per capita, as well as proportion of
state-owned entities representing the level of state monopoly for an industry. As seen
from the estimation results, regional socioeconomic development has a beneficial effect
on individual income. Controlling for other covariates in the model, an additional 10,000
yuan of county GDP per capita raises the average individual income by 4%; an additional
year of average education in the county leads to a more than 20% increase in average in-
come. With respect to industry characteristics, the average income across industry types
differs substantially, and compared to other employees, agricultural employees on average
earn much less. This may reflect both the disadvantaged position of agriculture in China’s
economic structure and the seasonal fluctuation of agricultural revenue. Furthermore, the
higher the proportion of female employees, the lower the average individual income; the
higher the proportion of employees with higher education, the higher the average individ-
ual income; and the higher the proportion of state-owned entities in the industry, the
higher the average individual income, as is consistent with Wang and Cui’s (2010) finding
that average income is higher in monopolized industries. In contrast, industry age, indus-
try scale, and the average revenue per capita have no significant effect on individual in-
come. Since model 2 does not control for individual characteristics, so the above results
cannot be regarded as firm evidence of regional and industrial effects in that they can as
well be a reflection of a statistical artifact due to an instance of ecological fallacy. In other
words, these structural differences may result from different compositions of individual
sociodemographics and human capital stock across regions and industries.
To rule out this possibility, we further estimate model 3 to include both individual
and region/industry covariates simultaneously. As shown in model 3 of Table 3, the co-
efficients for individual covariates are essentially the same as in model 1, so there is no
need to repeat them here. At the region level, even after controlling for individual char-
acteristics and human and political capital, the effects of county GDP per capita and
average years of schooling attenuate somewhat but still remain statistically significant,
indicating that the beneficial effect of regional socioeconomic development on individ-
ual income is genuine and beyond differential population compositions. At the industry
Table 3 Cross-classified multilevel models for individual monthly income (Log), CFPS2010
(Continued)
Individual level residual (σ0i) 2.423 2.510 2.423
(.014) (.015) (.014)
Region level residual (σ0j) .629 .585 .564
(.043) (.040) (.039)
Industry level residual (σ0k) .799 .0001 .00002
(.134) (.003) (.003)
Numbers in brackets are estimated standard errors. The corresponding sample sizes for individual, region and industry
are 14,698, 162, and 19, respectively
†p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001
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level, however, after controlling for individual covariates, the effects of proportion of fe-
male employees, proportion of employees with higher education, and proportion of
state-owned entities all become statistically insignificant.11 These results reflect that the
lower average income for industries with a higher proportion of female employees may
have more to do with the fact that females earn much less than males at the individual
level rather than sexual “discrimination” against the whole industry. Similarly, the high
average income for high technology industries (with more employees with higher edu-
cation) and monopolized industries (with a higher proportion of state-owned entities)
is also partly a reflection that these industries attract more individuals having better hu-
man and political capital (Zhang 2004). Therefore, it is crucial to control for the effects
of individual characteristics when examining inter-industry income gaps. Nonetheless,
even after controlling for a broad array of individual differences, agricultural employees
still earn significantly less than employees from other industries, as indicated by the
results in model 3.
Macro–micro linkages for income inequality
In the above, we examined the effects of various explanatory variables at the individual,
region, and industry levels on individual income. However, it remains to be answered
how different social and institutional settings (such as living in different counties or
working in different industries) influence the income returns from various individual
characteristics, i.e., the macro–micro linkages regarding income inequality. For ex-
ample, we are interested in whether a female worker will be less discriminated against
if she works in an industry dominated by female employees, whether the income return
from education will be lower in an industry with a high concentration of highly edu-
cated employees, whether party membership is more important in monopolized indus-
tries, etc.
To address these questions, we add cross-level interactions into our cross-classified
multilevel model. Considering that the sample size for industries is fairly small (N = 19)
in our data, we separately add the interaction terms between region/industry covariates
and individual gender, residence type, education, party membership, occupational ISEI,
and type of work unit, using model 3 of Table 3 as the baseline model. The estimation
results for these models are given in Table 4.
Numbers in the first column (model 4) of Table 4 show how the gender gap for indi-
vidual income varies across different regions and industries. First of all, there is a sig-
nificant interaction effect between county GDP per capita and gender, and an
additional 10,000 yuan increase in GDP per capita reduces the gender gap for income
by 2%. This result is consistent with previous findings such as Hao and Li (2006), indi-
cating that one byproduct of economic development is reducing gender inequality. Sec-
ond, gender inequality in income tends to be lower in industries with more highly
educated employees. One possible explanation is that these industries are likely to be
high technology industries, and they may rely more on human capital and are less af-
fected by traditional norms and practices such as gender discrimination. Third, the
gender gap in income tends to be more severe in industries with more state-owned en-
tities. This finding contradicts results from Wang and Cui (2010); further studies are
necessary to better understand the issue. Last, there is no evidence that supports that
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an increase in the percentage of female employees in an industry can reduce gender
discrimination. In fact, the corresponding result suggests that the gender gap tends to
be larger in industries with a higher proportion of female employees, though this effect
is not statistically significant.
The second column (model 5) in Table 4 presents results for possible variations in
the rural-to-urban income gap across regions and industries. These results show that
the rural-to-urban income gap is nearly universal, and there is almost no significant dif-
ference by region or industry. The only exception is for employees working in indus-
tries with high proportions of state-owned entities, where urban residents enjoy a
larger income advantage than rural residents do. Compared with private enterprises,
state-owned enterprises are more likely to be concentrated in urban areas and tend to
hold stricter requirements for their workers regarding hukou status. In fact, it is very
Table 4 Cross-classified multilevel model with cross-level interactions for individual monthly
income (Log), CFPS2010




(Model 4) (Model 5) (Model 6) (Model 7) (Model 8) (Model 9)
Main effect
Main effect for each
column variable
.127 .650 .098* .068 −.002 .289
(.404) (.484) (.044) (.645) (.014) (.479)
County GDP per
capita
.044*** .035* .052*** .033** .041* .036***
(.012) (.016) (.014) (.011) (.017) (.011)
County average
education
.103* .154** .140* .111** .130* .126**
(.046) (.053) (.053) (.042) (.062) (.043)
% of female
employees
−.702 .222 .776 .121 −1.115 −.115
(.539) (.450) (.600) (.320) (.732) (.341)
% of employees with
higher
education
.756† .298 −.629 .396 .987 .499
(.441) (.490) (.711) (.418) (.771) (.453)
% of state-owned
entities
1.048 .533 1.333 1.687 −4.599* −.093
(1.605) (1.612) (1.629) (1.597) (2.025) (1.644)
Cross-level interaction with
region variable
GDP per capita −.019* −.0001 −.002† .0004 −.0002 −.011
(.009) (.014) (.001) (.017) (.0003) (.010)
Average education .014 −.044 −.003 .002 −.001 −.059





.421 .013 −.085 −.335 .031† .895
(.587) (.526) (.060) (.813) (.018) (.639)
% of employees with
higher
education
−.656* .062 .081† −.062 −.011 −.458
(.314) (.335) (.042) (.409) (.011) (.386)
% of state-owned
entities
2.202*** 1.904*** .066* 1.582** .164*** 5.611***
(.251) (.278) (.030) (.508) (.030) (.884)
Numbers in brackets are estimated standard errors. The corresponding sample sizes for individual, region, and industry are
14,698, 162, and 19, respectively. These models also control for the main effects of other variables shown in model 3 of Table 3
†p < .1; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001
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difficult for rural hukou holders to obtain formal employment from state-owned
entities, and this may exacerbate their already existing income disadvantage.
Similarly, the third column (model 6) in Table 4 examines how the income return
from education varies according to region and industry characteristics. Firstly, there is
weak evidence that the income return from education is somewhat lower in more eco-
nomically developed regions than in less developed regions, but the coefficient is very
small and it is only statistically significant at the p < .1 level. Secondly, in contrast to
the so-called frog-pond effect,12 the concentration of highly educated employees in an
industry does not reduce the income return from education at all. Rather, our results
show that these industries tend to have a higher income return from education, which
is consistent with Wang and Cui (2010). Given the same number of years of schooling,
working at an industry with more highly educated employees in general returns more
income. This may have something to do with the match between employment and edu-
cation. In high technology industries, specialized knowledge and skills are crucial for
maintaining productivity, and hence such industries are more likely to pay commensur-
ate with training when the employee has higher education. By contrast, in traditional
industries that require less specialized knowledge and skills, it is more difficult to re-
ceive a commensurate pay for highly educated individuals. Finally, model 6 also shows
that the income gap between different educational groups widens as the industry be-
comes more monopolized, i.e., the income return from education increases as the pro-
portion of state-owned entities in an industry increases.
The fourth column (model 7) of Table 4 shows how the income benefit for party
membership varies by region and industry. Consistent with previous findings (Hao and
Li 2006; Xie and Hannum 1996), the effect of party membership on individual income
does not “deflate” with regional economic development and marketization, and we do
not find significant regional variations. At the industry level, there is a statistically sig-
nificant interaction effect between party membership and proportion of state-owned
entities in an industry. As the proportion increases, the income gap between party
members and non-members worsens, which may reflect the increasing importance of
political capital in monopolized industries.
The fifth column (model 8) of Table 4 examines possible heterogeneity of the income
gap across occupational status with respect to different regions and industries. Results
show that there is no heterogeneous effect from occupation on individual income
across regions. In contrast, this effect varies significantly by industry. In particular, the
occupational variation of individual income increases as either the proportion of female
employees or the proportion of state-owned entities increases in an industry. The latter
may reflect the fact that there exist huge income gaps between managerial staff mem-
bers and ordinary workers in state-owned enterprises.
The last column (model 9) of Table 4 shows how the effect of work unit on individual
income varies by region and industry characteristics. Similar to what we found for place
of residence and party membership, among all the region and industry factors consid-
ered here, the only significant cross-level interaction effect is for industrial monopoly
(i.e., the proportion of state-owned entities in an industry). As the proportion of state-
owned entities increases, the income advantage of working at state/collective units
becomes even larger, suggesting that people enjoy cumulative benefits for working at
monopolized sectors in monopolized industries.
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Conclusion and discussion
In this study, based on data from CFPS and region/industry statistics, we fit cross-
classified multilevel models to examine the impact of labor market segmentation on in-
come inequality in contemporary China. Our main findings are as follows:
First, both region and industry segregations are important causes of elevated income
inequality, and they together account for about one fifth of the total variation in indi-
vidual income. Comparatively, the impact of industry segregation is much larger than
that of region segregation, and the former accounts for 14%, while the latter accounts
for less than 7% of total variation.
Second, region and industry factors are important determinants of average individual
income. Regional economic and educational development has a beneficial effect on in-
creasing individual income; Working at non-agricultural industries, industries with a
low proportion of female employees and industries with a high proportion of highly ed-
ucated employees and with a high proportion of state-owned entities all help to secure
a higher average income. Even after controlling for individual gender, education, work
experience, place of residence, party membership, occupation, and type of work unit,
the positive effects of regional economic and educational development on individual in-
come are still statistically significant, and non-agricultural workers have substantially
higher earnings than agricultural workers as well. These findings support dual-labor
market segmentation with respect to region and industry in China. That is, individual
income is not only determined by individual characteristics and human capital stock,
but also is affected by social and structural factors across region and industry.
Finally, we further explore the underlying mechanisms through which macro-level
factors such as region and industry characteristics affect income inequality among dif-
ferent social groups. Our findings show that both region and industry factors affect the
level of income inequality for different genders, urban and rural residents, different
educational groups, party members and non-members, different occupational statuses,
and different types of work unit. Especially, as the proportion of state-owned entities in
an industry increases, the income gaps among various social groups widen substan-
tially. This suggests that industrial monopoly has been a key factor that drives rising in-
come inequality in China.
Our findings have important theoretical and practical implications for understanding
the issue of income inequality in China. This study not only provides empirical evi-
dence supporting the idea of labor market segmentation theory, but also shows the
multiplicity and complexity of labor market segmentation, which offers insights by
which we can further refine the current theory. Furthermore, as shown by this study,
macro structures such as region and industry characteristics are important sources of
widening income inequality in China. Therefore, reducing the imbalance in regional de-
velopment and limiting inter-industry income gaps are both critical to our ability to
narrow the large income gaps in contemporary China. In particular, policy priority
should be given to how to trim industrial monopoly given that it is the singly most im-
portant structural factor that drives income inequality across different social groups.
Determining how best to eliminate the status privilege associated with administrative
monopoly and to restrict the rapid increases in income for high ranking managerial
staff members, while simultaneously raising ordinary workers’ income, should be the
priority for the ongoing reform of income distribution.
Qi and Liang The Journal of Chinese Sociology  (2016) 3:28 Page 17 of 20
To alleviate the huge income disparity in China, it is necessary to continue and deepen
the ongoing market reform, to eradicate the existing local protectionism and industry bar-
riers, and to build up a nationally unified, open labor market that allows workers to move
freely across regions and industries. At the same time, we should also be aware of the
polarization effect brought by market forces. In fact, during the last several decades, many
developed countries also witnessed an increase in income inequality, and such increases
have caused some serious social problems such as the “Occupy Wall Street” movement in
the USA (Piketty 2014; Stiglitz 2012). In other words, the market economy should be
closely monitored and it is important to build up a comprehensive and effective social
safety net that can help manage and control the adverse consequences of market
competition.
It is worth noting that our study has some serious limitations: First, this is largely a
cross-sectional study, and the findings only represent a snapshot of the income inequal-
ity issue in China and should not be extrapolated without caution. For instance, the
finding that industry segregation has a larger impact on income inequality than does re-
gion segregation may not hold for other periods given that China is undergoing rapid
social transformation. Second, due to data limitations,13 we base our analysis of inter-
industry differences on primary industrial categories rather than more detailed classifi-
cations. This may introduce some misspecification errors in our study. Moreover, given
the small number of primary industrial categories, the statistical power is jeopardized
for part of our analysis; for future studies, it would be helpful to utilize more detailed
industrial classifications to test the robustness of our findings.
Endnotes
1According to relevant international rankings on inequality, the Gini coefficient was
.473 in 2013 in China, placing it 27th among 141 countries using the available data.
This coefficient is much higher than that for other major countries in the world such
as the USA, Russia, Britain, and Japan. Please see https://www.cia.gov/library/publica-
tions/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2172rank.html for details.
2In total, CFPS2010 interviewed 33,600 individuals aged 16 and above. We dropped
4478 respondents who aged 65 and above, 13,577 respondents who were not in the
work force, 160 respondents whose monthly income is missing, two respondents who
do not report education, 106 respondents whose occupation is missing, and 579 re-
spondents whose industry cannot be clearly classified, respectively. The final sample for
our analysis is 14,698 individuals.
3According to the type of work unit reported by respondents, we treat party and gov-
ernment offices, public institutions, social organizations, and state or collective owned
enterprises as employed in state/collective sectors, and treat all other responses as not
employed in state/collective sectors.
4Due to the instance of zero values for reported monthly income, we added one into
the original values before taking the log transformation.
5There are also other indicators in the CFPS county data file, such as urbanization rate
and employment rate. However, preliminary analysis shows that these variables are highly
correlated with country mean level of education, and for simplicity, we did not include these
variables in our analysis. It is worth noting that some previous studies considered the effect
of marketization level on individual income (e.g., Bian and Zhang 2002; Hao and Li 2006).
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Due to data limitations, we cannot examine this effect directly in this study. Nonetheless,
previous studies indicate that regional marketization level is highly correlated with its eco-
nomic development (e.g., Hao and Li report that the correlation coefficient between these
two variables is larger than .7), and for this reason, GDP per capita can be regarded as an in-
direct indicator of level of regional marketization.
6For details about this model, please refer to Hox (2010): Chap. 9.
7ρ ¼ σ0j2σ20iþσ20jþσ20k ¼
0:7292
2:5112þ0:7292þ1:0602 ¼ 0:067




9It is worth noting that the classification is more precise for regions (N = 162) than
for industries (N = 19), which may have implications for comparing the relative import-
ance of segregation by region and industry. Nevertheless, the use of primary industrial
groups generally leads to more within-group heterogeneities and tends to underesti-
mate between-industry variations, which does not change our basic conclusion that in-
dustry segregation is more important than region segregation in explaining income
inequality in contemporary China.
10The estimated income gap between males and females is larger in our study than in
studies by others. This is mainly due to the fact that our sample includes both urban
and rural residents, while rural China has a more unequal distribution of income across
gender than its urban counterpart. For instance, in our analytical sample, the average
monthly income is 1079.5 yuan for rural males and 370.3 yuan for rural females, while
it is 2410.8 yuan for urban males and 1594.6 yuan for urban females.
11It is worth noting that these results are not consistent with previous findings such as
Wang and Cui (2010). Whether this is due to differences in sample size, variable construc-
tion, model form, or other possible reasons remains to be determined by future studies.
12That is, the same frog will look bigger if it is in a pond full of small frogs than in a
pond full of big frogs.
13In CFPS2010, only primary industrial codes were released. For details, please refer
to CFPS’s technical report on occupational and industrial coding, available at http://
www.isss.edu.cn/cfps/d/file/wd/jsbg/2010jsbg/77efb2575f04de262ec706d7eddfefff.pdf.
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